Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
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Publication:1360949
DOI10.1007/s003550050077zbMath0881.90012OpenAlexW2017418549MaRDI QIDQ1360949
Publication date: 23 July 1997
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050077
Related Items (9)
Double implementation by a simple game form in the commons problem ⋮ Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria ⋮ A solution to the problem of consumption externalities. ⋮ Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties ⋮ Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules ⋮ An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria ⋮ Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations ⋮ Strong implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Robust coalitional implementation
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