Reputation and dynamic Stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.0126zbMath0880.90159OpenAlexW1997345325MaRDI QIDQ1361861

Masaki Aoyagi

Publication date: 1 February 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0126

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamelong-run player without discountingperturbed gameStackelberg payoff

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (10)

Optimal policy with credibility concerns ⋮ Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts ⋮ The emergence of cooperation through leadership ⋮ Occurrence of Deception Under the Oversight of a Regulator Having Reputation Concerns ⋮ On the size and structure of group cooperation ⋮ Reputation with observed actions ⋮ Reputation effects in stochastic games with two long-lived players ⋮ Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information ⋮ Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games

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