Consistency of assessments in infinite signaling games

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(96)00782-3zbMath0880.90140MaRDI QIDQ1361898

Mathijs Jansen, Andrés Perea y Monsuwé, H. J. M. Peters

Publication date: 28 July 1997

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

strong consistencyconsistency of assessmentsinfinite signaling games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

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• A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
• On the behavior of separating equilibria of signaling games with a finite set of types as the set of types becomes dense in an interval
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
• Sequential Equilibria
• Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games
• Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games

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