The principal-agent problem with evolutionary learning

DOI10.1007/BF00240424zbMath0873.90148OpenAlexW1977999263MaRDI QIDQ1361918

O. Diekmann

Publication date: 28 July 1997

Published in: Computational \& Mathematical Organization Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00240424

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriagenetic algorithmbounded rationalityincentivesagency theoryobject-oriented computer simulationprincipal-agent game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Economics of information (91B44) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Learning by doing vs. learning from others in a principal-agent model ⋮ Crowd computing as a cooperation problem: An evolutionary approach ⋮ A multi-criteria agency model with incomplete preference information.

This page was built for publication: The principal-agent problem with evolutionary learning