Debt, moral hazard and airline safety: An empirical evidence
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Publication:1362490
DOI10.1016/S0304-4076(97)82989-2zbMath0900.62647OpenAlexW2788469885MaRDI QIDQ1362490
Charles Vanasse, Robert Gagné, Georges Dionne, François Gagnon
Publication date: 12 August 1997
Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4076(97)82989-2
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Cites Work
- Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
- A new approach for modeling economic count data
- Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
- Overdispersion tests for truncated Poisson regression models
- Moral hazard, renegotiation and debt
- A count data model with unobserved heterogeneity
- Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Methods: Theory
- Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Methods: Applications to Poisson Models
- Moral Hazard and Limited Liability: Implications for the Theory of the Firm
- A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence
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