Coalitional bargaining with competition to make offers

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0553zbMath0882.90139OpenAlexW2076276151MaRDI QIDQ1362605

O. Diekmann

Publication date: 5 August 1997

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0553

zbMATH Keywords

coresubgame-perfect equilibriumdiscrete-time noncooperative coalitional bargaining game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A simple noncooperative core story
• Order independent equilibria
• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining