On the relationship between risk-dominance and stochastic stability
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Publication:1362607
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0556zbMath0882.90132OpenAlexW1980575699MaRDI QIDQ1362607
Publication date: 5 August 1997
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221478
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