The hybrid equilibria and core selection in exchange economies with externalities
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Publication:1363084
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(95)00756-3zbMath0876.90030OpenAlexW2073218647MaRDI QIDQ1363084
Publication date: 7 August 1997
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(95)00756-3
Related Items (11)
A weak \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem of generalized games with infinitely many players and pseudo-utilities ⋮ Existence of alpha-core allocations in economies with non-ordered and discontinuous preferences ⋮ On the strong hybrid solution of an n-person game ⋮ A social coalitional weak equilibrium existence theorem with a continuum of agents and applications ⋮ The weak hybrid equilibria of an exchange economy with a continuum of agents and externalities ⋮ On the strong \(\beta\)-hybrid solution of an \(N\)-person game ⋮ The weak \(\alpha\)-core of exchange economies with a continuum of players and pseudo-utilities ⋮ A weak \(\alpha \)-core existence theorem of games with nonordered preferences and a continuum of agents ⋮ Competitive equilibria and benefit distributions of population production economies with external increasing returns ⋮ A \(\beta\)-core existence result and its application to oligopoly markets ⋮ Some generalizations of Zhao's theorem: hybrid solutions and weak hybrid solutions for games with nonordered preferences
Cites Work
- A generalization of Scarf's theorem: An \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem without transitivity or completeness
- The hybrid solutions of an \(n\)-person game
- An exchange economy can have an empty \(\alpha\)-core
- The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
- Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria
- The Core of an N Person Game
- A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
- Unnamed Item
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