Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(97)82720-6zbMath0876.90013MaRDI QIDQ1363085

Sang-Chul Suh

Publication date: 1 December 1997

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

exchange economycoalition formationNash implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (9)

Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies ⋮ Games of manipulation in marriage problems ⋮ Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria ⋮ Behavioral strong implementation ⋮ A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation ⋮ Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness ⋮ An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria ⋮ Strong implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Robust coalitional implementation

Cites Work

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• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
• An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability
• Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation

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