Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
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Publication:1363085
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(97)82720-6zbMath0876.90013MaRDI QIDQ1363085
Publication date: 1 December 1997
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (9)
Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies ⋮ Games of manipulation in marriage problems ⋮ Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria ⋮ Behavioral strong implementation ⋮ A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation ⋮ Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness ⋮ An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria ⋮ Strong implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Robust coalitional implementation
Cites Work
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- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
- An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability
- Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
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