Implementation in generalized matching problems
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Publication:1363086
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(96)00758-6zbMath0876.90012MaRDI QIDQ1363086
Publication date: 1 December 1997
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (21)
Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities ⋮ Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems ⋮ Existence of a competitive equilibrium when all goods are indivisible ⋮ Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities ⋮ On the unique core partition of coalition formation games: correction to İnal (2015) ⋮ The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium. ⋮ Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets ⋮ Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods. ⋮ Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems. ⋮ Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets ⋮ On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods ⋮ The core of endo-status games and one-to-one ordinal preference games ⋮ Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets ⋮ Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities ⋮ Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples ⋮ Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts ⋮ Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples ⋮ An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf ⋮ Double implementation without no-veto-power ⋮ On the existence of stable roommate matchings ⋮ Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
Cites Work
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