Time consistent taxation by a government with redistributive goals

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2217zbMath0883.90055OpenAlexW2058454962MaRDI QIDQ1363365

Ennio Stacchetti, David G. Pearce

Publication date: 7 August 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/100989

zbMATH Keywords

time consistencyconstrained-optimal equilibriumlinear tax schedule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (4)

A strategic dynamic programming method for studying short-memory equilibria of stochastic games with uncountable number of states ⋮ Optimal taxes without commitment ⋮ Stationary Markovian equilibrium in altruistic stochastic OLG models with limited commitment ⋮ Credible monetary policy in an infinite horizon model: Recursive approaches

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