The maximal generic number of pure Nash equilibria

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2213zbMath0883.90131OpenAlexW2036401256MaRDI QIDQ1363372

Andrew McLennan

Publication date: 23 March 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55720

zbMATH Keywords

pure strategy Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cites Work

• The maximal number of regular totally mixed Nash equilibria
• A theorem on the number of Nash equilibria in a bimatrix game
• A Bound on the Proportion of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Generic Games