A theorem on symmetric two-player zero-sum games

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2215zbMath0881.90132OpenAlexW1971753971MaRDI QIDQ1363375

Michel Le Breton, Gilbert Laffond, Jean-François Laslier

Publication date: 28 September 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2215

zbMATH Keywords

finite symmetric two-player zero-sum game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

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Cites Work

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