Game forms, rights, and the efficiency of social outcomes

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2201zbMath0883.90006OpenAlexW1979596441MaRDI QIDQ1363525

Prasanta K. Pattanaik, Laura Razzolini, Rajat K. Deb

Publication date: 10 August 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2201

zbMATH Keywords

game formSen's familiar paradox of the Paretian liberal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

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A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights ⋮ Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization ⋮ Freedom of choice in a social context: comparing game forms ⋮ A paradox of expert rights in abstract argumentation ⋮ Between liberalism and democracy. ⋮ A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation ⋮ Separable discrete functions: recognition and sufficient conditions ⋮ Consistent rights on property spaces ⋮ Daunou's voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities ⋮ Individual powers and social consent: an axiomatic approach ⋮ An axiomatic approach to predictability of outcomes in an interactive setting ⋮ Liberalism, efficiency, and stability: Some possibility results ⋮ A trade-off result for preference revelation ⋮ Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.

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