Copeland method. II: Manipulation, monotonicity, and paradoxes
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Publication:1363527
DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2205zbMath0884.90009OpenAlexW1975380769MaRDI QIDQ1363527
Vincent R. Merlin, Donald G. Saari
Publication date: 28 September 1997
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1112.pdf
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