Credible proposals in communication games

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2206zbMath0883.90126OpenAlexW2019932427MaRDI QIDQ1363528

Iñigo Zapater

Publication date: 10 August 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2206

zbMATH Keywords

simple communication gamesnonequilibrium theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (6)

Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games ⋮ Rationalizable signaling ⋮ Pragmatic reasoning about unawareness ⋮ Informal communication ⋮ Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria ⋮ Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions

This page was built for publication: Credible proposals in communication games