The structure of non-manipulable social choice rules on a tree
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Publication:1364439
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(93)00720-FzbMath0879.90012OpenAlexW2086880510WikidataQ127629520 ScholiaQ127629520MaRDI QIDQ1364439
Publication date: 4 September 1997
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(93)00720-f
Related Items (20)
On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties ⋮ Strategy-proofness and ``median voters ⋮ Strategy-proof aggregation rules and single peakedness in bounded distributive lattices ⋮ The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks ⋮ On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness ⋮ On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions ⋮ ON STRATEGY‐PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS ⋮ Weakly unimodal domains, anti-exchange properties, and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules ⋮ Necessary and sufficient conditions for pairwise majority decisions on path-connected domains ⋮ Strategy-proof location of public facilities ⋮ Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options ⋮ Strategy-proof location on a network ⋮ Single peaked domains with tree-shaped spectra ⋮ Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains ⋮ Majority judgment and strategy-proofness: a characterization ⋮ Unanimous and Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Single-Peaked Preference Profiles on Graphs ⋮ Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle ⋮ Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains ⋮ Preferences Single-Peaked on a Tree: Multiwinner Elections and Structural Results ⋮ Strategy-Proof Location Functions on Finite Graphs
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