Vetoing in social choice with blockings

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(93)00725-AzbMath0879.90017OpenAlexW1993497939MaRDI QIDQ1364448

Aleksandr I. Sotskov

Publication date: 25 January 1998

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(93)00725-a

zbMATH Keywords

strong Nash equilibriablockingvoting by vetocore equilibriaelimination procedures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

A lemma in open sequential voting by veto ⋮ Properties of open procedure of sequential veto-voting ⋮ Voting by veto and the role of the compromise function

Cites Work

• On strongly consistent social choice functions
• On strong representations of games by social choice functions
• Sub-core solutions of the problem of strong implementation
• Convexity of integer veto and elimination procedures
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Consistent Voting Systems
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