Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules

DOI10.1016/S0166-218X(96)00100-XzbMath0879.90060OpenAlexW2019142746WikidataQ127565005 ScholiaQ127565005MaRDI QIDQ1364784

Douglas R. Woodall

Publication date: 28 August 1997

Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/dam

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicityvoting paradoxCondorcet's principlepreferential election rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (8)

A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure ⋮ Varieties of failure of monotonicity and participation under five voting methods ⋮ The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity ⋮ Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving ⋮ A characterization of proportionally representative committees ⋮ A continuous rating method for preferential voting. The incomplete case ⋮ Voting Procedures, Complexity of ⋮ Strategic voting and nomination

Cites Work

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• Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
• An impossibility theorem for electoral systems
• Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate

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