Quasi-cores in bargaining sets

DOI10.1007/BF01263272zbMath0879.90198OpenAlexW4245443294MaRDI QIDQ1364996

Ken-Ichi Shimomura

Publication date: 28 August 1997

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01263272

zbMATH Keywords

TU gamesMas-Colell bargaining setZhou bargaining set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (7)

The bargaining set and coalition formation ⋮ A characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura) ⋮ The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games ⋮ Proto-coalition bargaining and the core ⋮ Existence of fuzzy prekernels and Mas-Colell bargaining sets in TU games ⋮ On the least core and the Mas-Colell bargaining set ⋮ The bargaining set for almost-convex games

Cites Work

• An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
• An existence theorem for a bargaining set
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• An inductive method for constructing mimmal balanced collections of finite sets
• Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
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