The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
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Publication:1365004
DOI10.1007/BF01263279zbMath0880.90019OpenAlexW3122007865MaRDI QIDQ1365004
Henry Tulkens, Parkash Chander
Publication date: 5 February 1998
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01263279
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Cites Work
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Cost share equilibria: a Lindahlian approach
- How to share the cost of a public good
- Cores of convex games
- Egalitarian-Equivalent Cost Sharing of a Public Good
- The Ratio Equilibria and the Core of the Voting Game G(N, W) in a Public Goods Economy
- Dynamic Procedures and Incentives in Public Good Economies
- Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
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