Competition between asymmetrically informed principals

DOI10.1007/S001990050155zbMath0882.90008OpenAlexW1970331255MaRDI QIDQ1365365

Thomas A. Gresik, Eric W. Bond

Publication date: 28 August 1997

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050155

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationPareto inefficient equilibriacommon agency gameslump sum payments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (1)

Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability

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