Arrow's theorem and Turing computability
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Publication:1365367
DOI10.1007/s001990050157zbMath0882.90003OpenAlexW2138509834WikidataQ55899880 ScholiaQ55899880MaRDI QIDQ1365367
Publication date: 10 March 1998
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55723
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