Evaluation of some weighted majority decision rules under dependent voting

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(94)00752-7zbMath0877.90006OpenAlexW2029312442MaRDI QIDQ1366888

Sven Berg

Publication date: 17 September 1997

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(94)00752-7

zbMATH Keywords

weighted majority rulescorrelated votesdichotomous votingexpert rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

The importance of expertise in group decisions ⋮ Epistemic democracy with correlated voters ⋮ The price of independence in a model with unknown dependence ⋮ Effective group size of majority vote accuracy in sequential decision-making ⋮ General representation of epistemically optimal procedures ⋮ Collective decision making in hierarchies

Cites Work

• The significance of independent decisions in uncertain dichotomous choice situations
• Condorcet's jury theorem in light of de Finetti's theorem. Majority-rule voting with correlated votes
• Condorcet's jury theorem, dependency among jurors
• Collective rationality versus distribution of power for binary social choice functions
• Performance evaluation of some special classes of weighted majority rules
• Modelling dependence in simple and indirect majority systems
• Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations
• Power Structure in Dichotomous Voting

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