On a dynamic auction mechanism for a bilateral assignment problem

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(94)00754-3zbMath0877.90030OpenAlexW1996430504MaRDI QIDQ1366893

Jayaram K. Sankaran

Publication date: 17 September 1997

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(94)00754-3

zbMATH Keywords

multi-item auctionsbilateral assignmentcomputational issuedynamic auction mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model ⋮ A speedy auction using approximated bidders' preferences ⋮ Properties of the DGS-auction algorithm ⋮ Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions ⋮ Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders ⋮ Time bounds for iterative auctions: a unified approach by discrete convex analysis ⋮ Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions ⋮ A method for finding the maximal set in excess demand

Cites Work

• The assignment game. I: The core
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