Optimistic stability in games of perfect information

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(94)90003-5zbMath0877.90096OpenAlexW1986291787MaRDI QIDQ1366896

Benyamin Shitovitz

Publication date: 17 September 1997

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(94)90003-5

zbMATH Keywords

extensive form gamesabstract stable setsoptimistic stable standard of behaviorRubinstein's discrete bargainingsubgame perfect paths

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (3)

Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency ⋮ Conservative stable standards of behavior and \(\varphi\)-stable sets ⋮ The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
• On the existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium in infinite-action games of perfect information
• A unique solution to \(n\)-person sequential bargaining
• Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Individual and Collective Time-Consistency
• Multistage Situations

This page was built for publication: Optimistic stability in games of perfect information