Boundedly rational Nash equilibrium: A probabilistic choice approach
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Publication:1367678
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0514zbMath0889.90165OpenAlexW1988384575MaRDI QIDQ1367678
Hsiao-Chi Chen, James W. Friedman, Jacques-François Thisse
Publication date: 4 June 1998
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e077403ffbdcb8a0f13baa5b599dc08026522bb0
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Cites Work
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- A set-theoretic random utility model of choice behavior
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- An iterative method of solving a game
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- Discrete Choice and Variable Returns to Scale
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