A noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules
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Publication:1367679
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0526zbMath0889.90171OpenAlexW2244032812MaRDI QIDQ1367679
Nir Dagan, Roberto Serrano, Oscar Volij
Publication date: 4 June 1998
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.nirdagan.com/research/199702/full.pdf
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