Common \(p\)-belief: The general case
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Publication:1367680
DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0513zbMath0893.90034OpenAlexW2004022658MaRDI QIDQ1367680
Publication date: 22 July 1998
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0513
Related Items (6)
Contemporary epistemic logic and the Lockean thesis ⋮ Tenacious selection of Nash equilibrium ⋮ Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games ⋮ Epistemic foundations for set-algebraic representations of knowledge ⋮ Cooperation under incomplete information on the discount factors ⋮ Public information, private information, and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games.
Cites Work
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- Common knowledge, communication, and convergence of beliefs
- Common knowledge with probability 1
- Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
- Agreeing to disagree
- ``Impossibility of speculation theorems with noisy information
- Stochastic common learning
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- The Foundations of Probability
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