Repeated large games with incomplete information

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0522zbMath0889.90175OpenAlexW1965764544MaRDI QIDQ1367683

Rann Smorodinsky, Ehud Lehrer

Publication date: 4 June 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0522

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Social learning in recurring games, Reputation versus social learning, Necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence to Nash equilibrium: The almost absolute continuity hypothesis, Limits to rational learning, Learning, rare events, and recurrent market crashes in frictionless economies without intrinsic uncertainty, Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information, Relative entropy in sequential decision problems

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