Deposit insurance and regulation in a Diamond-Dybvig banking model with a risky technology

DOI10.1007/BF01213849zbMath0883.90016MaRDI QIDQ1367708

Denise Hazlett

Publication date: 1 October 1997

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazarddeposit insurance schemesDiamond-Dybvig banking model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

Related Items (1)

Inefficient liquidity provision

Cites Work

• Demand deposit contracts, suspension of convertibility, and optimal financial intermediation
• Banking, incentive constraints, and demand deposit contracts with nonlinear returns
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity

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