Why clashes between internal and external stability goals end in currency crises

DOI10.1007/BF01886207zbMath0900.90057OpenAlexW3124500551MaRDI QIDQ1367814

Michael D. Bordo, Anna J. Schwartz

Publication date: 4 June 1998

Published in: Open Economies Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01886207

zbMATH Keywords

currency crisesfundamentalsself-fulfilling prophecies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• Analyzing and managing exchange-rate crises
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• Exchange Rate Dynamics with Sluggish Prices under Alternative Price-Adjustment Rules
• Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers
• Global Implications of Self-Oriented National Monetary Rules

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