A prekernel characterization by means of stability properties

DOI10.1007/BF02568511zbMath0887.90188OpenAlexW1975640684MaRDI QIDQ1367874

Emilio Calvo, Esther D. Gutiérrez

Publication date: 6 May 1998

Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02568511

zbMATH Keywords

corecooperative gameleast coreprekernel

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• A note on a generalization of the nucleolus to games without sidepayments
• The \(\tau\)-value, the core and semiconvex games
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• Excess functions and nucleolus allocations of pure exchange economies
• The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
• The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• The N-kernel in cooperative games without side payments
• Excess Functions for Cooperative Games without Sidepayments
• Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences

This page was built for publication: A prekernel characterization by means of stability properties