Incentive roles and fringe benefits in compensation contracts

DOI10.1007/BF01226934zbMath0887.90021MaRDI QIDQ1367890

Liang Zou

Publication date: 6 May 1998

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardincentivesrisk sharingfringe benefits

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Moral hazard and compensation packages: does reshuffling matter?

Cites Work

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