Convergence in economic models with Bayesian hierarchies of beliefs

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.2254zbMath0887.90003OpenAlexW2022093200MaRDI QIDQ1367893

Yaw Nyarko

Publication date: 6 May 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/44ff0fc4ba74196550457a5432dc738240d1775f

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Economic growth models (91B62)

Related Items (2)

Impact of higher-order uncertainty ⋮ Testable implications of subjective expected utility theory

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