A never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2248zbMath0887.90195OpenAlexW1988601817MaRDI QIDQ1367909

Alejandro M. Manelli

Publication date: 6 May 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2248

zbMATH Keywords

existence of equilibriasequential equilibriuminfinite signaling games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
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• Multidimensional signalling
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• Stochastic optimal control. The discrete time case
• D1 signaling equilibria with multiple signals and a continuum of types
• The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games
• Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Signalling with Many Signals
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Market Equilibrium with Hidden Knowledge and Self-Selection
• Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
• Informational Equilibrium
• Strategic Information Transmission
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization
• Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games
• Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games

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