Incentive contracts in two-sided moral hazards with multiple agents

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2253zbMath0887.90044OpenAlexW2084740179MaRDI QIDQ1367910

Nabil I. Al-Najjar

Publication date: 6 May 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1143.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

contractingoptimal incentive schemesprincipal-agent contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard ⋮ Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard

Cites Work

• Efficiency in partnerships
• Classical statistics as a theory of incentives
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
• Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed

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