A model of agreements in strategic form games

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2251zbMath0889.90173OpenAlexW2012168807MaRDI QIDQ1367911

Marco Mariotti

Publication date: 4 June 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2251

zbMATH Keywords

coalitional contingent threat situationequilibrium for the bargaining procedure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

Rationalizability for social environments ⋮ Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution ⋮ Coalition formation as a dynamic process. ⋮ PERIODIC STRATEGIES: A NEW SOLUTION CONCEPT AND AN ALGORITHM FOR NONTRIVIAL STRATEGIC FORM GAMES ⋮ Which acceptable agreements are equilibria? ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) ⋮ Non-optimal Nash bargaining solutions ⋮ Dynamic coalitional equilibrium ⋮ Theories of coalitional rationality ⋮ Strong coalitional equilibria in games under uncertainty ⋮ The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information ⋮ Coalition formation among farsighted agents ⋮ International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight

Cites Work

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• Farsighted coalitional stability
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
• Theory of Moves