Implementing coordinated team play

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2249zbMath0887.90198OpenAlexW2022794735MaRDI QIDQ1367913

Anil Arya, John S. Hughes, Jonathani Glover

Publication date: 6 May 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2249

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazard modeljoint production

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items

Voluntary implementation, Inefficiency and complementarity in sharing games

Cites Work

• Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
• Stopping agents from ``cheating
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
• Exact implementation
• A simple forecasting mechanism for moral hazard settings
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• A Note on Abreu-Matsushima Mechanisms
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms