The geometry of implementation: a necessary and sufficient condition for straightforward games
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Publication:1367924
DOI10.1007/s003550050065zbMath0886.90011OpenAlexW3123090160MaRDI QIDQ1367924
Geoffrey Heal, Graciela Chichilnisky
Publication date: 13 April 1998
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050065
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