The probability of Condorcet cycles and super majority rules

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2233zbMath0892.90005OpenAlexW1971655827MaRDI QIDQ1368871

Yves Balasko, Hervé Crès

Publication date: 1 October 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/10273

zbMATH Keywords

majority votingCondorcet cycles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes ⋮ Probabilities of preferences and cycles with super majority rules ⋮ Preference, topology and measure ⋮ Two preference metrics provide settings for the study of properties of binary relations ⋮ What shall we do with the cyclic profile?

Cites Work

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• Condorcet proportions and Kelly's conjectures
• The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution
• Geometry of voting
• A probabilistic interpretation of Eulerian numbers
• On 64%-Majority Rule
• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
• Voting Anomalies, the Number of Voters, and the Number of Alternatives
• Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
• On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule

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