Probabilities of preferences and cycles with super majority rules

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2310zbMath0892.90012OpenAlexW2065955799MaRDI QIDQ1368872

Craig A. Tovey

Publication date: 3 August 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2310

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet cyclessupermajority voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes ⋮ When ties are possible: weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality ⋮ The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist. ⋮ Beta distributions in a simplex and impartial anonymous cultures

Cites Work

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• Probability and convergence for supra-majority rule with Euclidean preferences
• The probability of Condorcet cycles and super majority rules
• On 64%-Majority Rule
• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives

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