Independence on relative probability spaces and consistent assessments in game trees

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2295zbMath0892.90199OpenAlexW1983435294MaRDI QIDQ1368873

Philip J. Reny, Elon Kohlberg

Publication date: 1 October 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2295

zbMATH Keywords

strong independenceconsistent assessment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

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