One-shot public mediated talk

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0545zbMath0894.90178OpenAlexW2080781377MaRDI QIDQ1369068

Sylvain Sorin, Ehud Lehrer

Publication date: 7 October 1997

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1108.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

mechanismscommunication equilibriumprivate messagepublic mediated talk

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44)

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Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals, A simple model of secure public communication, A property of Nash equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information, Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players, A detail-free mediator, Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring., Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information., A note on one-shot public mediated talk., Preface: Special issue in honor of the 60th birthday of Sylvain Sorin, Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games, How to talk to multiple audiences, A commitment folk theorem, A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions, Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game, Jointly controlled lotteries with biased coins, Cheap talk in games with incomplete information., Secure protocols of how communication generates correlation, Efficiency in correlated equilibrium

Cites Work

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• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Mediated talk
• Universal Mechanisms
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality