Balanced contributions axiom in the solution of cooperative games

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0565zbMath0894.90183OpenAlexW2120804904WikidataQ114018517 ScholiaQ114018517MaRDI QIDQ1369071

Francisco Sánchez S.

Publication date: 7 October 1997

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0565

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueBanzhaf value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (7)

Decomposition of solutions and the Shapley value ⋮ Balanced externalities and the Shapley value ⋮ New characterizations of the Owen and Banzhaf-Owen values using the intracoalitional balanced contributions property ⋮ Potentials and solutions of cooperative games with a fixed player set ⋮ Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value ⋮ Balanced per capita contributions and level structure of cooperation ⋮ Cost Sharing in Production Economies

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On weighted Shapley values
• An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules

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