Games of manipulation in marriage problems
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Publication:1369072
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0559zbMath0894.90184OpenAlexW2010625201MaRDI QIDQ1369072
Publication date: 7 October 1997
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/59e934a46ba31d0cd48a154a5e7bbc5a223dc004
Related Items (14)
Dynamically stable matching ⋮ Matching markets under (in)complete information ⋮ Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Profit-maximizing matchmaker ⋮ Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets ⋮ Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems. ⋮ Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems ⋮ A further note on the college admission game ⋮ In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm ⋮ Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities ⋮ Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism ⋮ The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets ⋮ Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms ⋮ On the existence of stable roommate matchings
Cites Work
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- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- The manipulability of the Shapley-value
- A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
- A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
- Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
- Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
- Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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