Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
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Publication:1371137
DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2307zbMath0892.90047OpenAlexW2083091948MaRDI QIDQ1371137
Uriel G. Rothblum, Alvin E. Roth, Yosef Blum
Publication date: 5 January 1998
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/679949f892151a0941d706f51d1196165b455e0f
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Related Items (36)
Stability in dynamic matching markets ⋮ Random path to stability in a decentralized market with contracts ⋮ Decentralized matching at senior-level: stability and incentives ⋮ Analysis of stochastic matching markets ⋮ The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings ⋮ The substitutes condition and the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations ⋮ School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds ⋮ The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts ⋮ School choice with transferable student characteristics ⋮ Quasi stable outcomes in the assignment game ⋮ Locally Stable Marriage with Strict Preferences ⋮ Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare ⋮ Vacancies in supply chain networks ⋮ Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints ⋮ The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences ⋮ Markovian assignment rules ⋮ A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms ⋮ Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints ⋮ The lattice of envy-free matchings ⋮ Decentralized job matching ⋮ Welfare and stability in senior matching markets ⋮ The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems ⋮ Restabilizing matching markets at senior level ⋮ Efficiency, stability, and commitment in senior level job matching markets ⋮ Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets ⋮ Decentralized matching: the role of commitment ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm ⋮ Incentives in decentralized random matching markets ⋮ On the Stable Matchings That Can Be Reached When the Agents Go Marching in One By One ⋮ Agreement toward stability in matching markets ⋮ Competitive Equilibrium and Trading Networks: A Network Flow Approach ⋮ Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains ⋮ Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts ⋮ Paths to stable allocations ⋮ ``Timing is everything and marital bliss ⋮ Dominance solvable English matching auctions.
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- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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