Generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions for sender-receiver cheap-talk games

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2309zbMath0893.90183OpenAlexW1977952389MaRDI QIDQ1371139

In-Uck Park

Publication date: 28 October 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2309

zbMATH Keywords

generic determinacy of equilibriareduced form equilibriasender-receiver cheap-talk games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (10)

Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games ⋮ The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games ⋮ Generic finiteness of equilibrium distributions for bimatrix outcome game forms ⋮ Markov perfect equilibria in repeated asynchronous choice games ⋮ Determinacy of equilibrium outcome distributions for zero sum and common utility games ⋮ Generic finiteness of outcome distributions for two-person game forms with three outcomes ⋮ Costly network formation and regular equilibria ⋮ Determinacy of equilibrium in outcome game forms ⋮ Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games ⋮ On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games

Cites Work

• Refining cheap-talk equilibria
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Oddness of the number of equilibrium points: a new proof
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
• Sequential Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Economies with a Finite Set of Equilibria
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