Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types

Cites Work

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On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
Implementation in differential information economies
A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
A new approach to the implementation problem
Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism
Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
Implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations
Bayesian monotonicity with side payments
Continuous and feasible implementation of rational-expectations Lindahl allocations
The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism
On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
Subgame Perfect Implementation
Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
Optimal Auction Design
Bayesian Implementation
Incentives in Teams
Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
A Note on the Characterization of Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences
Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
Feasible and Continuous Implementation
Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms
Convergence of stochastic processes

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