Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games
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Publication:1371185
DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2304zbMath0883.90136OpenAlexW1976389051MaRDI QIDQ1371185
Ron Holzman, Benyamin Shitovitz, Ezra Einy, Dov Monderer
Publication date: 28 October 1997
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/22e2462354d8e11bfddf1d6409a3e446f35dafb6
von Neumann-Morgenstern stable setMas-Colell bargaining setmeasurable space of playerscore of a continuous convex game
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Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems ⋮ von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of income tax rates in public good economies ⋮ On the equal treatment imputations subset in the bargaining set for smooth vector-measure games with a mixed measure space of players ⋮ The bargaining set of a large game ⋮ On the least core and the Mas-Colell bargaining set ⋮ The bargaining set for almost-convex games
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