Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2304zbMath0883.90136OpenAlexW1976389051MaRDI QIDQ1371185

Ron Holzman, Benyamin Shitovitz, Ezra Einy, Dov Monderer

Publication date: 28 October 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/22e2462354d8e11bfddf1d6409a3e446f35dafb6

zbMATH Keywords

von Neumann-Morgenstern stable setMas-Colell bargaining setmeasurable space of playerscore of a continuous convex game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Related Items

Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems ⋮ von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of income tax rates in public good economies ⋮ On the equal treatment imputations subset in the bargaining set for smooth vector-measure games with a mixed measure space of players ⋮ The bargaining set of a large game ⋮ On the least core and the Mas-Colell bargaining set ⋮ The bargaining set for almost-convex games

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